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Following the presentation of a reminder, consolidated memories become reactivated
followed by a process of re-stabilization, which is referred to as reconsolidation. The
most common behavioral tool used to reveal this process is interference produced by
new learning shortly after memory reactivation. Memory interference is defined as a
decrease in memory retrieval, the effect is generated when new information impairs an
acquired memory. In general, the target memory and the interference task used are the
same. Here we investigated how different memory systems and/or their valence could
produce memory reconsolidation interference. We showed that a reactivated neutral
declarative memory could be interfered by new learning of a different neutral declarative
memory. Then, we revealed that an aversive implicit memory could be interfered by the
presentation of a reminder followed by a threatening social event. Finally, we showed that
the reconsolidation of a neutral declarative memory is unaffected by the acquisition of an
aversive implicit memory and conversely, this memory remains intact when the neutral
declarative memory is used as interference. These results suggest that the interference
of memory reconsolidation is effective when two task rely on the same memory system
or both evoke negative valence.
Keywords: reconsolidation, interference, declarative memory, pavlovian conditioning, social threat, boundary
conditions
INTRODUCTION
Memory interference is defined as a decrease in memory retrieval or performance as a product
of new learning. This effect is generated when new information impairs a previously acquired
memory. This phenomenon is not only found in laboratory settings, but it is also proposed
as the main responsible of forgetting in daily life (Wixted and Ebbesen, 1997; Wixted, 2004;
Squire et al., 2015). There are different types of interference that could affect different memory
phases (acquisition, consolidation, reconsolidation, or retrieval; Wixted, 2004; Roediger et al.,
2007; Besnard et al., 2012; Robertson, 2012; Forcato et al., 2014). Even more, depending on the
procedure and timing, the interference could act on memory storage (consolidation), re-storage
(reconsolidation) or its retrieval (output). In the first two cases, the observed decrease in memory
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retention would be irreversible and the stored representation
would be impaired (Anderson, 2003; Wixted, 2004; Forcato
et al., 2007; Fernández et al., 2016a). On the other hand, a
reduced memory retrieval would reflect an inhibitory process or
competition between memories. This effect could be reversible
by the passage of time or when a recovery protocol is applied
(Bouton, 2002, 2004; Anderson, 2003).
Memory storage implies a passage from a fragile state to a
stable form, a process called memory consolidation (McGaugh,
2000). However, following the presentation of a memory
cue (reminder), consolidated memories become reactivated
(labilized), followed by a process of re-stabilization, which is
referred to as reconsolidation (Nader et al., 2000; Dudai, 2012;
Fernández et al., 2016b). The reconsolidation process is crucial
for the modification of existing memories and is the mechanism
by which the strength and/or content of consolidated memories
are updated (Forcato et al., 2011, 2013, 2014; Inda et al., 2011;
de Oliveira Alvares et al., 2012; De Oliveira Alvares et al.,
2013; Fukushima et al., 2014). However, it sounds dangerous
to put at risk a memory every time it is retrieved. In this
context, different reports define boundary conditions for the
process (Forcato et al., 2014). Thus, memory features such as
strength and age are crucial boundary conditions that limit the
beginning of the reconsolidation process (Eisenberg and Dudai,
2004; Milekic et al., 2006; Inda et al., 2011; Dudai, 2012; Forcato
et al., 2013).
Reconsolidation is typically revealed by the absence
(impairment) of the target memory at testing using
pharmacological or behavioral tools (Lee, 2009). In humans,
the most common behavioral tool used is memory interference
produced by new learning shortly after the reminder presentation
(reactivation) of a consolidated memory (Forcato et al., 2014).
Several reports showed that the effective time window to
impair memory reconsolidation is between 6 and 10 h after
memory reactivation (i.e., declarative: Forcato et al., 2007;
Kroes et al., 2014; aversive: Nader et al., 2000; Schiller et al.,
2010). However, the interference task is usually similar to
the target memory (Walker et al., 2003; Forcato et al., 2007;
Hupbach et al., 2007; Wichert et al., 2011, 2012; Potts and
Shanks, 2012; Fernández et al., 2016a). For example, in human
declarative memories, Forcato et al. (2007) used two lists of
non-sense syllables, Hupbach et al. (2007) two list of objects
and Wichert et al. (2011) two sets of images. Even more, in
a motor memory, Walker et al. (2003) used two different
finger-tapping tasks. All in all, these results support the idea of a
re-storage impairment, and consequently the loss of the original
information.
In spite of the profuse research on memory reconsolidation,
the conditions under which the interference of this process occurs
was scarcely explored. In general, the consolidated memory
and the newly acquired one (interference task) share several
common elements such as: contextual cues, the task itself,
valence, and memory systems (declarative/implicit). Therefore,
it remains an open question whether interference between
two memories requires an exact match between the tasks to
produce memory impairment. This question gains relevance
from a neurobiological perspective. Retrieval reactivates the
same neural pathways active during initial learning (Shimamura,
2014). This concept implies a competition for shared resources
between the reactivated and new memory. Then, we can
expect that the reconsolidation of a target memory is disrupted
by interference tasks that rely on the same memory system.
Moreover, the allocation and synaptic tagging hypothesis (Silva
et al., 2009; Rogerson et al., 2014) showed that if a new
information shortly follows a learning episode, the very same
recently active circuits will be recruited to represent the new
memory, producing memory interference. In this background,
interference should be effective when the new task can re-
use the same neural-substrates as the target memory. The
aim of the present study was to investigate the conditions
under which the interference of memory reconsolidation occurs.
We analyzed when interference occurred across non-identical
tasks that use the same vs. different memory systems. With
this aim, we used four different learning protocols, which
generated two different neutral declarative memories and two
implicit aversive memories. In Experiments 1 and 2 we matched
memory system and emotional value of the tasks (neutral
declarative or implicit negative memories, respectively). In
Experiments 3 and 4 we used non identical memory systems
and valence, using either a neutral declarative memory or an
implicit aversive memory as target or interference memory. Our
findings suggest that the reconsolidation of a target memory is
disrupted by interference tasks that rely on the same memory
system
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
A total of 301 undergraduate and graduate students (170 females
and 131 males) from Buenos Aires University (Argentina) mean
age of 24±2, participated in the current study. Other 19 subjects
were excluded from the analysis based on each protocol inclusion
criterion. Prior to the experiments, participants provided a
written informed consent that was approved by the Ethics
Committee of the Review Board of the Sociedad Argentina
de Investigación Clínica. Subjects were randomly assigned to one
group.
Basic Experimental Procedure
The basic experimental design in all cases included a
target memory and an interference task. During day 1,
participants were trained with the target memory (training,
Figure 1 inset). The following day (day 2) consisted of a
reactivation session of the target memory followed by an
interference task. Finally, during day 3 a testing session
of both memories was performed. To determine whether
the interference specifically affected the target memory
reconsolidation we compared the following experimental
groups: a Reminder+Interference group (i.e., the reminder
is intended to reactivate the target memory and received the
interference task), a Reminder group (i.e., reactivation with
no interference), noReminder+Interference group (i.e., no
memory reactivation) and a Control group (i.e., only acquired
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FIGURE 1 | Experimental Procedures. Table: Experimental design and the protocols used in Experiments 1–4. Each letter corresponds to the memory protocol
used below. (A) Neutral declarative memory I (List 1). A trial consisted of the context period, i.e., a specific combination of a light (color illumination of the room),
image (a picture) and sound (music), and by a syllable period, i.e., after the stimulus presentation, the five pairs of cue-response syllables (List 1 as shown) were
presented successively 10 times. Testing session consisted in the context formation and two cue recall trials. (B) Neutral declarative memory II (List NW). Consisted
of the presentation of the first syllable of the non-word (left side of the computer screen) and a white box (right side of the computer screen) where subjects
completed the entire non-word. In a trial, the 14 non-words were presented. Training consisted in nine trials and testing in two trials. (C) Implicit aversive memory
(fear pavlovian conditioning). Three male images were used a CS. The stimuli were presented in two different block-contexts, which had different reinforcement
probabilities. In the threatening context (red background), the US (a tone) was associated with one of the male angry images (CS1-T) but never with the other two
stimuli (CS2-T or CS3-T). The safe context (green background) consisted in the blocks in which the stimuli were never reinforced (CS1-S, CS2-S, and CS3-S). A trial
consisted in a CS presentation within each block-context. Each stimulus was presented five times during acquisition and extinction. (D) Social threatening event
(VAP). Schematic diagram showing timing of the tasks and the different measures obtained: Subjective Rating (STAI), cardiovascular activity (Blood Pressure and
Heart Rate), and electrodermal activity (SCL). Social Stress part I refers to the speech in front of an auditory (VAP. Social Stress part II stands for the arithmetic task
and was conducted as above. The arrows stand for the time when the measures were taken.
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the interference task on day 2). Importantly, a 5 min interval was
used between target memory reactivation and the interference
task, based on previous works of memory reconsolidation
in humans that demonstrated it requires at least 6 h for this
process to be completed (Forcato et al., 2007; Kroes et al.,
2014).
We used four different memory paradigms, either as target
memories or interference tasks (Figure 1 inset). In particular, two
were neutral declarative tasks: the non-sense syllables protocol
(used in Experiments 1, 3, and 4) and the non-words list (used in
Experiment 1). The other two protocols included an emotionally
negative component: a fear Pavlovian conditioning (used in
Experiments 2, 3, and 4) and a social threatening event (VAP)
(used in Experiment 2).
EXPERIMENT 1: INTERFERENCE OF A
NEUTRAL DECLARATIVE MEMORY
To determine if the memory system is required to be the
same in both the target memory and the interference task we
performed Experiment 1. In this experiment, the interference
of memory reconsolidation was evaluated using two different
neutral declarative memory tasks: the List 1 (target memory) and
the List NW (interference task).
A total of 52 participants (25±2,8 years old) were randomly
assigned to four groups, depicted in Figure 2A (n = 13
per group): Reminder, Reminder-NW, noReminder-NW, and
Control-NW groups.
Target Memory: Non-sense Syllables
Protocol (Neutral Declarative Memory)
Training Session (Day 1)
Participants learned a list of five pairs of non-sense syllables (List
1) in an enriched specific context (image, colored light and music;
for details see Forcato et al., 2007). Each pair was formed by a cue
syllable associated with a response syllable (Figure 1A). In the
first training trial, the List 1 was shown, and in the successive
trials subjects were required to write down the corresponding
response-syllable for each cue-syllable presented. During the
training session, the list was presented in 10 trials. The Training
session is reported as the mean number of errors per training
trial.
Reminder (Day 2)
The reminder was formed by the specific context and a
cue-syllable immediately followed by an interruption message
without any opportunity to complete the target (Forcato et al.,
2009).
Testing Session (Day 3)
Consisted of two testing trials. Errors were classified as: Void-type
errors (blank responses), associated with memory persistence
(Forcato et al., 2013), Confusion-type errors (writing a non-
existent response syllable), associated with memory precision
(Forcato et al., 2011), and intralist-type errors (writing response
syllables for a different cue syllable). Only the subjects that
achieved at least 65% of correct responses during the last four
training trials were included.
Interference Task: Non-words Protocol
(Neutral Declarative Memory II)
Training Session (Day 2)
After the reminder presentation, subjects learned a list of 14 non-
words (List NW, Figure 1B) with a constant background image
in the PC monitor (a forest landscape). The non-words were
taken from a rioplatense-Spanish neuropsychological test (Rugg,
1984; Ferreres et al., 2003). In the first training trial the entire
List NW was shown. In the successive trials, the first syllable of
the non-word appeared on the left side of the screen (i.e., “JI”)
and an empty dialog box (a blank rectangle) was shown on the
right side, in which participants had to type the entire non-word
(i.e., “JIBANA”, Figure 1D). A trial ended when the entire list of
non-words was presented. Subjects had 6 s to respond and when
they answered correctly the word remained in black color for 4 s.
Otherwise, the correct response appeared in red color for 4 s.
Training session consisted of nine trials.
It is important to highlight that in spite of both tasks (List 1
as target and List NW as interference task) consisted in verbal
material (six letters split into two syllables or an entire non-
word), they differed in their associative nature (associative vs.
non-associative) and context in which it occurred (enriched vs.
simple).
Testing Session (Day 3):
Participants were tested with two presentations of the non-words
list using the same procedure as mentioned above. Only the
subjects that achieved at least 65% of correct responses during
the last three training trials on Day 2 were included.
Amnesic Effect (Retrieval vs. Reconsolidation
Impairment)
Considering that memories are integrated into complex
associative networks, we used the retrieval-induced forgetting
effect as an indirect method to reveal the amnesic effect of the
interference task on the target memory reconsolidation (List
1; Anderson et al., 1994). This effect implies that the retrieval
of a target memory could temporary block the retrieval of
related memories. Because memories share elements (room,
experimenter, etc.), it is expected that they interact during
retrieval. Thus, if the List 1 memory is intact, its retrieval
temporally interferes with the subsequent retrieval of a related
memory (Retrieval-Induced Forgetting –RIF-, high number of
errors for the interference task at testing). Otherwise, if List 1
is impaired (i.e., memory reconsolidation was interfered), its
retrieval does not interfere with the interference task retrieval
(no-RIF, few errors for the interference task testing (Forcato
et al., 2007).
Statistical Analysis
The Training session of List 1 and List NW are reported as
the mean number of errors per training trial and was analyzed
with repeated-measures ANOVA. The Testing session of both
declarative memories were first analyzed with one-way ANOVA
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FIGURE 2 | Experiment 1. The reconsolidation of a neutral declarative memory (List1) could be interfered by the presentation of a reminder followed by the
acquisition of a memory with similar memory system and/or valence on Day 2 (List NW). (A) Experimental protocol. A 3 day experiment. (B) Target memory testing
session (List 1). (C) Interference task testing session (List NW). (D) Error type. Mean number of total errors ±SEM on Day 3, ∗ p < 0,05, NW refers to List NW
training. Abbreviations as above.
and followed by post hoc comparisons (FISHER, α = 0,05). We
analyzed the types of errors of List 1 in the same manner as testing
session.
Results
Neutral Declarative Memory Task (List 1 and List NW)
There were no significant differences between the groups at List
1 training [Repeated-measures ANOVA, List 1 F(2,33) = 0,694,
p > 0,05] as well no group by trial interaction [List 1,
F(16,264) = 0,399, p > 0,05, Supplementary Figure S1].
The analysis of List 1 performance at testing (Day 3)
showed that the Reminder-NW and the noReminder-NW
groups made significantly more errors compared with the
Reminder group [Figure 2B, one-way ANOVA F(2,33) = 4,593,
p < 0,01, post hoc LSD comparison, preminder−NW < 0,01
and pnoReminder−NW < 0,05, respectively]. Regarding the error
type, the Reminder-NW group committed more Confusion-
type errors than the other groups [Figure 2D, F(2,33) = 5,877,
p < 0,005, post hoc LSD comparison, pnoReminder−NW < 0,05
and pReminder < 0,005]. No differences were found for the
Void-type and Intralist-type error (pall > 0,05). Thus, the groups
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 5 December 2016 | Volume 10 | Article 641
fnhum-10-00641 December 17, 2016 Time: 17:38 # 6
Fernández et al. Interference Conditions of the Reconsolidation Process
that received the interference List NW (Reminder-NW and
noReminder-NW groups) had an increased number of errors
independently of receiving the reminder on Day 2. To disentangle
if List 1 performance at testing was a result of an impairment
effect on memory reconsolidation or retrieval interference, we
analyzed the List NW interference task performance (see amnesic
effect in Section “Interference Task: Non-words Protocol (Neutral
Declarative Memory II)”]. Our hypothesis (Forcato et al., 2007)
states that when Retrieval-Induced Forgetting (RIF) is revealed
(i.e., a high number of errors for List NW at testing), this implies
that the target memory remains intact. However, if the target
memory is impaired, there should be no-RIF effect (i.e., low
number of errors for List NW.
Figure 2C shows a similar number of errors at List NW testing
in the Reminder-NW and the Control-NW groups, revealing the
absence of RIF [Day 3; one-way ANOVA F(2,33)= 4,90, p< 0,01,
post hoc LSD comparison pReminder−NWvs.Control−NW p > 0,05].
In contrast, the noReminder-NW group committed significantly
more errors than the other groups indicating the presence of
RIF (pReminder−NW < 0,01 and pControl−NW < 0,05, respectively).
Thus, the acquisition of a different neutral declarative memory
(List NW) after the reminder presentation (Reminder-NW
group) impaired the reconsolidation of the target neutral
declarative memory (List 1). Additionally, the List NW training
without memory reactivation by the reminder presentation
(noReminder-NW group) only inhibited the retrieval of the
target memory (List 1).
These results highlight the importance of shared memory
systems in order to impair memory reconsolidation by new
learning after the reminder presentation.
EXPERIMENT 2: INTERFERENCE OF AN
AVERSIVE IMPLICIT MEMORY
To study how two similar emotionally negative memories
or experiences could produce the interference of memory
reconsolidation, we performed Experiment 2. We used an
implicit aversive memory protocol (target memory, Fear
Pavlovian conditioning) and a social threatening event
(interference task, Virtual-Auditory Protocol; Fernández
et al., 2015). A total of 52 participants (23±2,5 years old) were
randomly assigned to three groups (Figure 3) (n= 17 per group):
Reminder, noReminder-VAP and Reminder-VAP groups.
Target Memory: Pavlovian Fear
Conditioning Protocol (Implicit Aversive
Memory)
Pavlovian fear conditioning involves the process by which the
representation of two events (stimulus) become associated and
then, one of them (CS) is capable of predicting the occurrence
of the other (US; Rescorla, 1988; Pavlov and Anrep, 2003).
Importantly, fear responses are context-modulated. For example,
a tiger represents a real threat in the jungle but not in the zoo
(Holland, 1992; Bouton, 2002; Maren et al., 2013). Here we aim
to highlight this contextual aspect of fear using a new Pavlovian
conditioning which generates a fearful association between cues
(CS–US) modulated by two different contexts (threatening and
safe contexts, see below).
In order to strengthen the fear association during training,
we used fear relevant stimuli as CS (Seligman, 1971; Öhman
and Mineka, 2001). The pictures were taken from the Karolinska
Directed Emotional Faces (KDEF) database (Lundqvist et al.,
1998). Three different male faces (CS1, CS2, and CS3,
Figure 1B),) were presented in the center of a black screen (slides
of 9,5 cm× 7 cm. Two of them (CS1 and CS2) expressed anger in
their faces and the other one (CS3) was neutral (no emotion).
Each CS was presented in two different block-contexts, with
different reinforcement probabilities. In the threatening context,
the three CS’s appeared in a red background and the US was
presented in 55% of trials, only with one of the CSs (hereafter
CS1-T) but never with the other two images (CS2-T or CS3-T).
The safe context consisted of the blocks in which the same CSs
were presented in a green background and were never reinforced
(hereafter CS1-S, CS2-S, and CS3-S). Therefore, only one CS was
reinforced in only one context (CS1 in the threatening context:
CS1-T). An auditory stimulus (tone) with duration of 1,5 s
delivered through stereo headphones served as US. All the CS
were presented for 6 s and the US appeared 1,5 s before CS
offset. The interval between stimuli varied between 8 s, 10 s, and
12 s. The tone was generated by a TG/WN Tone-Noise Generator
(Psychlab), digitally controlled (range 30 to 2000 hz) with a mean
of 96 db±4 db. The US was adjusted for each subject to be
“unpleasant but not painful” (100 db was the maximum allowed
for any subject).
Training Session (Day 1)
On day 1, subjects were informed that one of the slides specifically
in one context would be followed by an unpleasant tone (US) in
most of the cases. They were also instructed to pay attention to
the color-contexts and to predict the US arrival (US expectancy)
with an external keypad (YES/NO buttons) during the expectancy
period of each CS (YES/NO boxes appeared on the screen
for 3 s). Stimuli were presented during three block-contexts
(threatening/safe). Each CS appeared five times for 6 s in each
context (threatening/safe) with the exception of CS1-T (the
reinforced CS in the threatening context) which was presented
11 times (55% of reinforcement, Figure 1B). The order of block-
contexts and CS presentation was pseudo-randomized. Finally,
assignment of the aversive slides (CS1 and CS2) as the reinforced
stimulus in the threatening context was counterbalanced across
subjects.
Fear acquisition was measured by the skin conductance
response (SCR). The input device (Psychlab Precision Contact
Instruments, www.psychlab.com) has a sine excitation voltage
(±0,5 V) of 50 Hz derived from the main frequency. The device
was connected to two Ag/AgCl electrodes of 20 mm × 16 mm
located in the intermediate phalanges of the index and middle
fingers of the non-dominant hand. SCR produced by each CS was
measured by taking the average baseline to the first peak within
the 0,5−6 s window following stimulus onset. For the CS1-T, only
the non-reinforced trials were analyzed. A minimum response
criterion of 0,002 micro Siemens (µS) was used and all the
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FIGURE 3 | Experiment 2. The reconsolidation of an implicit aversive memory (pavlovian conditioning) could be interfered by a social threatening event after its
reactivation on Day 2. (A) Reminder group. (B) noReminder-VAP group. (C) Reminder-VAP group. Mean SCR (µS) ±SEM. Left panel: Fear conditioning training (PAV)
on Day 1. Right panel: Extinction training on Day 3 (EXT). Right inset: Renewal test after extinction training. VAP refers to the social threatening event.
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other responses were scored as zero (Kindt et al., 2009; Boucsein,
2012). The raw SCR scores were square-root transformed to
normalize distributions. Since fear-relevant stimulus usually have
stronger SCR amplitudes and generalizes faster (Seligman, 1971;
Öhman and Soares, 1998; Lissek et al., 2005), we used the mean
differential SCR between each fear-relevant CS (CS1 and CS2)
and the neutral one (CS3; Schiller et al., 2010; Agren et al., 2012)
in each context (i.e., CS1-T–CS3-T), given a total of 4 stimuli
analyzed: CS1-T, CS1-S, CS2-T, and CS2-S. Data was analyzed
with Matlab (Mathworks Inc. Sherborn, MA, USA) and Ledalab
(Benedek and Kaernbach, 2010). Only subjects who showed
differential fear responding (CS1-T SCR amplitude> others CS’s)
during acquisition were considered for analysis.
US Expectancy
During CS presentation (in each context) subjects were instructed
to press YES or NO button (expectancy keys of the external
keypad) when the YES/NO boxes appeared in the inferior section
of the screen. The subject has to press YES if he thinks that
the US will follow that CS and NO if otherwise. US expectancy
was analyzed using the mean of errors committed in the US
prediction for each context (threatening/safe) and trial.
Stimuli Aversiveness
After the end of training (Day 1) and extinction sessions (Day 3),
subjects were instructed to rank in a 1 to 10 scale how aversive or
unpleasant was each CS (CS1, CS2, and CS3 images) and the US
(tone).
Pavlovian Reminder (Day 2)
We developed a reminder based on previous findings with the
non-sense syllables protocol (Forcato et al., 2009) and taking
into account the fact that the US omission (a negative prediction
error) is the most typical kind of reminder (Kindt et al., 2009;
Schiller et al., 2010; Fernández et al., 2016b). Thus, the reminder
consisted of an unreinforced presentation of the CS1-T (i.e., a
negative prediction error). First, the CS1-T (the CS associated
with the US in the threatening context) was presented and then
the YES/NO boxes (US expectancy) were shown for 3 s. Finally,
the CS1-T disappeared (without US presentation) followed by
an interruption message announcing that the experiment was
finished.
Testing Session: Extinction (Day 2 or 3)
Memory extinction refers to the unreinforced presentation of the
stimulus previously associated with the US in each context (CS1-
T; Bouton, 2004). As a consequence, the intensity of the fear
response gradually decreases with each trial. Memory extinction
implies the formation of a new inhibitory memory, which
competes with the original one and allows the use of recovery
protocols (Bouton, 1993, 2002, 2004). During the extinction
session, participants put the headphones on and they were told
that the session would be similar to day 1. The presentation,
duration, number and intervals of the stimuli was the same as
in Day 1 and the subjects had to predict US arrival with the
external keypad (US expectancy). During extinction training, no
US (tone) was presented with any stimulus or context.
Renewal (Recovery Protocol, Day 2 or 3)
Following extinction training, we used a renewal protocol to
assess memory recovery. The rationale for this procedure is
that recovery protocols (reinstatement, spontaneous recovery,
renewal) are a powerful tool to differentiate reconsolidation
impairment from extinction memory (Kindt et al., 2009; Schiller
et al., 2010). That is, if the reconsolidation process is impaired,
the recovery protocol is unable to rescue the original information.
On the other hand, because of the inhibitory nature of
extinction, the original fear memory can be recovered after
this experimental manipulation. Here we used renewal as a
recovery protocol, which consists of the presentation of the
stimuli in a different or new context (Bouton, 1993). In our
experiments, after extinction was completed, the CS1, CS2,
and CS3 were presented only once with a black background
creating a new/different context (hereafter CS1r, CS2r, and
CS3r). The duration and inter-trial intervals were similar to the
other sessions. Here, subjects also had to predict US arrival
(US expectancy) and were asked to evaluate the aversiveness
of all the stimuli in a 1 to 10 scale after the session had
finished.
Statistical Analysis
(a) Electrodermal activity (SCR)
Skin conductance response amplitudes of the difference between
the fear relevant CS (CS1 and C2) and the neutral one (CS3)
in each context (threatening/safe) was analyzed by means of
a mixed analyses of variance (ANOVA) for Repeated-measures
with Group as between-subjects factor and stimulus (CS1-T, CS1-
S, CS2-T, and CS2-S) and trial (trials 1−5 of acquisition and
extinction) as within-subjects factors. The differential stimulus
response (CS1-T vs. others CS’s) was analyzed over time during
acquisition (first trial vs last trial), retention (last trial of
acquisition vs. first trial of extinction) and extinction (first trial
vs. last trial). When the interaction was significant, simple effects
were performed followed by LSD comparisons when appropriate.
The renewal test (CS1r vs. CS2r vs CS3r) was analyzed using
a two-factor ANOVA (group × stimulus) and followed by LSD
comparisons.
(b) US expectancy
US expectancy was analyzed using the mean of errors committed
in the US prediction for each context (threatening/safe) and trial.
During acquisition, an error was considered when participants
predicted the US with the incorrect CS or did not predict
the US with the correct one. Then, during the extinction
session, since no US was presented, any positive response
was considered an error. The absence of response was not
analyzed. US expectancy errors were analyzed by means of a
mixed repeated-measures ANOVA similar to the electrodermal
activity (SCR): Group as between-subjects factor and two within-
subjects factors: Context (threatening/safe) and trial (acquisition
and extinction). Since during the renewal test it was not
possible to obtain an error (since there is no previous rule to
predict the US), subjects’ responses were reported as percentage
of YES/NO responses to each stimulus (CS1r, CS2r, and
CS3r).
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(c) Stimuli aversiveness
The evaluative component of Pavlovian conditioning was
analyzed similar to the US expectancy with a mixed repeated-
measures ANOVA: Group as between-subjects factor and two
within-subjects’ factors: stimulus (CS1, CS2, CS3, and US) and
day (day 1 or day 2 vs. day 3).
Interference Task: Social Threatening
Event: Virtual-Auditory Panel (VAP)
The virtual-auditory panel (VAP) protocol (see detailed
description in Fernández et al., 2015) is an adaptation of the
Trier Social Stress Test (TSST) protocol. It consisted of three
phases (Figure 1C). Phase 1 was an undemanding attentional
task, in which 16 landscape images were shown and participants
were asked to rate the images according to their likes. In Phase 2,
participants had to prepare a speech to advertise themselves
as the best candidate for a professional position; this phase
lasted 5 min. Finally, in Phase 3, the experimenter explained
to the participants that a hospital committee was following the
presentation online using a webcam. As in the TSST protocol
(Kirschbaum et al., 1993), after the presentation, participants
had to perform an arithmetic task. The experimenter used a
pre-recorded ambient sound (different office sounds such as
engines, keys, chairs, etc.) as background and a pitch modifier
provided with three different voices (virtual panel) that simulated
a hospital committee.
Measurements
Baseline measurements for the State Trait Anxiety Inventory
(STAI, Spielberger et al., 1970), blood pressure, and heart rate
were taken before Phase 1. Blood pressure and heart rate were
measured at four different time points: t0 (before Phase 1), t1
(after Phase 2), t2 (after the speech presentation), and t3 (after
the arithmetic task; Figure 1C). Skin conductance level (SCL)
was recorded during the entire experiment; we defined the SCL
baseline level as the continuous measure during Phase 1. Blood
pressure, heart rate and the STAI were measured for the last time
at the end of Phase 3.
Statistical Analysis
(a) STAI
The STAI is reported as the mean score difference in each
participant at the end of Phase 3 and before the attentional task
(Phase 1). Data were analyzed using one-way analysis of variance
(ANOVA).
(b) Blood pressure and heart rate
A mean cardiovascular value (t0, t1, t2, t3) was reported
(mm/HG, BPM). Data were analyzed using Repeated-
measures ANOVA (Group × Time). When sphericity was
not accomplished, Greenhouse−Geisser correction was applied.
(c) Electrodermal activity (SCL)
It is reported as the mean SCL (µS) in each participant during
the baseline attentional task (Phase 1) and during stress induction
(Phase 3). The use of the mean SCL is supported by the stationary
time series of the signal and the low variability between points
(Fernández et al., 2015). Data were analyzed using repeated-
measures ANOVA (Group× Time).
Results
Implicit Aversive Memory Task (Fear Pavlovian
Conditioning)
(a) Electrodermal activity (SCR)
Acquisition on Day 1, measured by the SCR, showed fear
conditioning in all groups by the significant increase in
CS1-T SCR levels from trials 1 to 5 [Figure 3, left panel:
Mixed repeated-measures ANOVA, Stimulus× Trial Interaction:
F(9,405) = 3,948, p < 0,001, simple effects pCS1−T < 0,001;
Stimulus × Group Interaction: F(6,135) = 0,530, p > 0,05],
and in relation to the non-reinforced stimulus (Trial 5, simple
effects pCS1−Tvs.all < 0,05). Interestingly, on Day 3 only the group
which received the Pavlovian reminder followed by the social
threatening event (Reminder-VAP group) significantly decreased
CS1-T electrodermal activity (Figure 3, right panel). An
independent Repeated-measures ANOVA revealed the absence
of memory retention from the last trial of acquisition to
the first trial of extinction [Figure 3C, Reminder-VAP group,
F(1,15) = 10,096, p < 0,005] and the same profile was found
when comparing its SCR amplitude to the other stimulus [Factor
Stimulus: F(3,45) = 0,938, p > 0,05). Furthermore, SCR levels
during extinction in this group remained similar from trials
1 to 5 (p > 0,05). However, the Reminder and noReminder-
VAP groups, showed comparable SCR levels to the Pavlovian
training on Day 1 (Trials 5−1, p > 0,05). In both groups,
a significant decrease in SCR was observed during extinction
training from trials 1 to 5 (Trial: simple effects pCS1−T < 0,001).
Regarding the renewal test, a Two-way ANOVA revealed the
recovery of fear (SCR) for CS1r but not CS2r and CS3, only
in the Reminder and noReminder-VAP groups [Figures 3A,B,
inset; Group × Stimulus interaction: F(4,135) = 2,642, p < 0,05;
Stimulus Factor: F(2,135) = 10,30, p < 0,01; post hoc LSD
comparisons pCS1r−CS2r p < 0,001, pCS1r−CS3r p < 0,001 y
pCS2r−CS3r > 0,05]. In addition, in the Reminder-VAP group
no differences were found between stimuli (Figure 3C, LSD:
pCS1r−CS2r p > 0,001, pCS1r−CS3r p > 0,001 and pCS2r−CS3r > 0,05)
suggesting that memory reactivation before the threatening event
blocked the return of fear by impairing its reconsolidation.
(b) US expectancy
All groups accurately predicted the US with the CS1-T
presentation during acquisition on Day 1 [Figure S2,
repeated-measures ANOVA, Context × Trial Interaction:
F(9,1098) = 11,720, p < 0,001, Threatening context: Trials 1−2
p1−2 < 0,001] and predicted it during the first trial of extinction
on Day 3 (Threatening context p5−1 < 0,001; simple effects
pcontexts p < 0,001). Moreover, during trials 1−5 of extinction
training participants learned that the US was not delivered with
any stimulus (Trials 1−2 p1−2 < 0,01; Trials 4−5 p4−5 > 0,05).
Regarding the renewal test, nearly half of the subjects of each
group predicted the US when the CS1r was presented but not
with the CS2r and CS3r (Supplementary Table S1) suggesting
that the participants had not the proper information to make a
precise prediction about US occurrence.
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(c) Stimuli aversiveness
Ratings about stimulus aversiveness were comparable across
groups and stimulus between Day 2 and Day 3 [Supplementary
Table S2; Group × Stimulus interaction F(4,90) = 0,552,
p > 0,05]. We found as expected that: (1) the fearful CS (CS1
and CS2) were rated as more unpleasant than the neutral CS3
[Stimulus: F(2,90)= 306,264, <0,001, post hoc LSD comparisons
pCS1−CS3 < 0,01, pCS2−CS3 = < 0,01, and pCS1−CS2 > 0,05] and
(2) a generalized decrease in subjective ratings between days
[Trial: F(1,45)= 4,48, p < 0,05].
Aversive experience task (VAP)
All groups which experienced the social threatening event
(Reminder-VAP and noReminder-VAP) exhibited a significant
increase in sympathetic nervous system activity and cognitive
stress following its administration (Supplementary Table S3).
The VAP protocol induced an increment in cardiovascular and
electrodermal activity without any differences between groups.
Both VAP groups also showed similar STAI scores, which
suggests an increase in subjective stress and overall a successful
sympathetic activation (Supplementary Table S3).
From these results, we showed that a social threatening
event (VAP) after fear memory reactivation could impair
the memory reconsolidation. On the other hand, the US
expectancy and reported aversiveness of stimuli (Supplementary
Figure S2; Supplementary Tables S1 and S2) were not
affected in any group, suggesting, as in other reports
(Soeter and Kindt, 2010), that the expectancy and implicit
component of this memory could be independent. These
indicate that, in order to be effective, the interference
task used to impair memory reconsolidation requires
sharing memory system (declarative/implicit) and/or valence
(neutral/aversive).
EXPERIMENT 3 INTERFERENCE OF A
NEUTRAL DECLARATIVE MEMORY II
The goal of Experiment 3 was to determine whether the
reconsolidation of a neutral declarative memory (List 1) could
be interfered by an aversive implicit memory (fear Pavlovian
conditioning).
A total of 51 participants (24±2,1 years old) were randomly
assigned to four groups (Figure 4A) (n = 13 per group):
Reminder, Reminder-PAV, noReminder-PAV, and Control-PAV
groups.
FIGURE 4 | Experiment 3 (List 1). A neutral declarative memory is not affected or interfered by the acquisition of an implicit aversive memory on Day 2. (A)
Experimental protocol. A 3 day experiment. (B) Target memory (List 1) testing session. (C) Error type. Mean number of total errors ±SEM on Day 3. Rc, refers to
the presentation of the reminder, PAV to pavlovian conditioning training, and EXT to extinction training.
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Target Memory: Non-sense Syllables
Protocol (Neutral Declarative Memory)
We used the same task as in Experiment 1 as target memory.
Interference Task: Pavlovian Fear
Conditioning Protocol (Implicit Aversive
Memory)
We used the same procedure as described in Experiment 2 as
interference task.
Results
Neutral Declarative Memory Task (List 1)
There were no significant differences between the groups at
training of the target memory [Repeated-measures ANOVA,
List 1 F(2,43) = 0,578, p > 0,05]. In addition, there was
no group by trial interaction [List 1, F(16,344) = 0,571,
p > 0,05, Supplementary Figure S1]. On day 3 (testing
session), all groups had a similar performance. We found
no differences between groups at testing, irrespectively, of
receiving or not the reminder or the Pavlovian learning
[Figure 4B, One-way ANOVA F(2,45) = 0,263, p > 0,05].
The analysis of error types revealed also the absence of
difference between groups [Figure 4C, One-way ANOVA, Void-
type errors F(2,45) = 0,042, p > 0,05; Confusion-type errors
F(2,45) = 0,052, p > 0,05; Intralist-type errors F(2,45) = 0,199,
p > 0,05].
Implicit Aversive Memory Task (Fear Pavlovian
Conditioning)
Analysis of memory acquisition by the SCR showed an equivalent
fear learning on Day 2 for all groups (Figure 5 left panel, Mixed
repeated-measures ANOVA Stimulus×Group F(6,135)= 0,506,
p > 0,05), from the first to the last trial of acquisition [trial
1–5; Stimulus × Trial F(9,405) = 3,24, p< 0,001], specifically
for the reinforced CS in the threatening context (CS1-T; simple
effects pCS1−T < 0,01). The absence of differences between the
last trial of acquisition on Day 2 to the first extinction trial
on Day 3 revealed memory retention for all groups (Figure 5
right panel; pCS1−T > 0,05). The increased SCR level for CS1-
T in all groups differed from the others stimulus (simple
effects, first extinction trial pCS1−T/othersCS < 0,005). Finally, SCR
significantly decreased in all groups from the first extinction
trial to the last one (1–5 trials, simple effects pCS1−T < 0,001).
Moreover, no differences were found between stimulus in the
last extinction trial (trial 5, pall > 0,05) suggesting a successful
extinction training. We then analyzed the renewal test in
order to unveil this inhibitory memory and recover the fearful
response. A Two-way ANOVA revealed a significant increment
in SCR levels only for CS1r but not for CS2r and CS3r in
all groups [Figure 5, inset; Group × Stimulus interaction
F(4,135) = 0,179, p > 0,05; Stimulus factor F(2,135) = 11,21,
p < 0,001, post hoc LSD pCS1r−CS2r p < 0,001, pCS1r−CS3r
p < 0,001 y pCS2r−CS3r > 0,05]. As a whole, the analysis
of the SCR levels for CS1-T demonstrated that this fear
Pavlovian memory could be acquired, retained, extinguished,
and recovered. US expectancy and the reported aversiveness
of stimulus were correctly acquired (Supplementary Results;
Supplementary Figure S2; Supplementary Tables S1 and S2).
The results from Experiment 3 suggest that a neutral
declarative memory (List 1) and an implicit aversive memory
(fear Pavlovian conditioning) could be independently acquired
and without proactive or retroactive interference. Furthermore,
the reconsolidation of the neutral declarative memory (List 1)
triggered by the reminder was not affected by the Pavlovian
conditioning training.
EXPERIMENT 4: INTERFERENCE OF AN
AVERSIVE IMPLICIT MEMORY II
Experiment 4 consisted in a mirrored design of Experiment 3,
to evaluate further the possibility of interfering reconsolidation
of memories with different system and/or valence. Besides, we
wanted to discard any specific characteristics of the neutral
declarative memory (List 1) as a target memory or the implicit
aversive memory (Pavlovian conditioning) as the interference
task (Figure 7A).
A total of 68 participants (23±2,2 years old) randomly
assigned to four groups were included in Experiment 4
(n = 17 per group): Reminder, Reminder-L1, noReminder-L1,
and Control L1 groups.
Target Memory: Pavlovian Fear
Conditioning Protocol (Implicit Aversive
Memory)
We used the same task as described in previous experiments as
target memory.
Interference Task: Non-sense Syllables
Protocol (Neutral Declarative Memory)
We used the same procedure as described in Experiments 1 and
2 as interference task.
RESULTS
Implicit Aversive Memory Task (Pavlovian Fear
Conditioning)
On Day 1 we found a successful fear conditioning in all
groups (Figure 6, left panel), as well as retention – extinction
(Figure 6 right panel and inset; Supplementary Results).
The acquisition of the neutral declarative memory (List 1)
after the Pavlovian reminder did not affect SCR (implicit
component), US expectancy or the reported aversiveness of
stimulus (Supplementary Figure S2; Supplementary Tables S1
and S2).
Neutral Declarative Memory Task (List 1)
A repeated-measures ANOVA indicated no significant
differences between the groups for List 1 training on Day 2
[Supplementary Figure S1; F(2,43) = 0,12, p > 0,05] as well as
no group by trial interaction [F(16,344) = 0,58, p > 0,05]. The
evaluation of List 1 memory on Day 3 demonstrated that all
groups made a similar number of errors (Figure 7B, One-Way
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FIGURE 5 | Experiment 3 (fear pavlovian conditioning). Learning a fear pavlovian conditioning is not affected by the previous acquisition of a neutral declarative
memory (List 1). (A) Reminder-PAV group. (B) noReminder-PAV group. (C) Control-PAV. Mean SCR (µS) ±SEM. Left panel: Fear conditioning training (PAV) on Day 2.
Right panel: Extinction training on Day 3 (EXT). Right inset: Renewal test after extinction training.
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FIGURE 6 | Experiment 4 (pavlovian conditioning). An implicit aversive memory is not affected by the acquisition of a neutral declarative memory (List 1) on Day
2. (A) Reminder group. (B) Reminder-L1 group. (C) noReminder-L1 group. Mean SCR (µS) ±SEM. Left panel: Fear conditioning training (PAV) on Day 1. Right panel:
Extinction training on Day 3 (EXT). Right inset: Renewal test after extinction training. L1 refers to List 1 training and testing to its evaluation. Abbreviations as above.
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FIGURE 7 | Experiment 4 (List 1). Learning a neutral declarative memory is not affected by the previous acquisition of an aversive implicit memory (pavlovian
conditioning). (A) Experimental protocol. (B) Target memory (List 1) testing session. (C) Error type. Mean number of total errors ±SEM on Day 3. Abbreviations as
above.
ANOVA F(2,45) = 0,171, p > 0,05) irrespectively of its type
[Figure 7C, Void-type: F(2,45) = 0,342, p > 0,05; Confusion-
type : F(2,45) = 0,642, p > 0,05; Intralist-type: F(2,45) = 0,383,
p > 0,05]. These findings reveal that the acquisition of a neutral
declarative memory (List 1) after a Pavlovian-reminder did not
affect the implicit aversive memory, and that this memory is
not altered by the previous acquisition of the other one. Taken
together, these results replicate those founded in Experiment
3, showing that two independent memory systems (declarative
vs implicit) with different valence (neutral vs negative) are not
affecting each other’s reconsolidation, retention or acquisition.
DISCUSSION
The present findings demonstrate that behavioral interference
of the reconsolidation process requires a match between
memory systems supporting the target and the interfering
memory. Typically, the acquisition of a task similar to the
target memory after reactivation leads to the interference of
memory reconsolidation (Walker et al., 2003; Forcato et al.,
2007; Hupbach et al., 2007; Wichert et al., 2011). Here, we
first evaluated the effect of an interference task similar (but
not identical) to the target memory on the reconsolidation
process. We found that the acquisition of a different neutral
declarative memory (non-words list) after memory reactivation
impairs the reconsolidation of the target neutral declarative
memory (non-sense syllables, Experiment 1). Moreover, we
showed that an aversive social experience (VAP) impaired the
reconsolidation of a reactivated implicit aversive memory (fear
Pavlovian conditioning, Experiment 2). Notably, this constitutes
the first finding that showed reconsolidation of a Pavlovian fear
conditioning in humans could be impaired after its reactivation
by a social threatening event. Then, we analyzed memory
reconsolidation interference when the tasks used are dissimilar in
its system and/or valence. We showed that the acquisition of an
implicit aversive memory (fear Pavlovian conditioning) is unable
to impair the reconsolidation of a neutral declarative memory
after its reactivation (non-sense syllables, Experiment 3) and that
this memory does not affect the first one after the reminder
presentation (Experiment 4).
A limitation of our experiments is that we did not manipulate
one variable (i.e., valence) and maintain constant the other
variable (i.e., memory system), in order to disentangle the weight
of each factor (performing all the possible interactions). Future
experiments have to be performed to characterize these variables,
for example, using a list of negative emotional words or stories
(declarative negative memory).
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In the memory reconsolidation field, the conditions under
which behavioral interference occurs were scarcely explored.
Animal studies showed that the reconsolidation of a fearful
memory could be disrupted after its reactivation followed by
a distractor stimuli (air puff) or the exploration of a hole
board (Boccia et al., 2005; Crestani et al., 2015). In humans,
for example, Schwabe and Wolf (2009) showed that learning
a neutral story after reactivation of different autobiographical
memories (positive, negative, or neutral), reduced specifically the
retention of neutral memories. Additionally, Kredlow and Otto
(2015) found that a trauma-related memory could be interfered
by a negative story.
Numerous investigations in other memory phases (i.e.,
acquisition or consolidation) unveiled that the interference
between memories could be independent from the type of
material used in both tasks (Byrne, 2010). For example, McGeoch
and McDonald (1931) reported memory interference between
different verbal materials (parts of speech, synonyms, antonyms).
Müller and Pilzecker (1970) seminal work showed that a
set of non-sense syllables could be either interfered by the
acquisition of another set of syllables or a set of images.
Beyond the similarity between tasks, it was proposed the task
“cognitive-load” as a powerful amnesic agent to the extent that
it interrupts the elaborative rehearsal process associated with
memory acquisition (Spear, 1973; Wixted, 2004; Dewar et al.,
2007). A classic Skaggs’s (1925) study found that the retention
of chess positions decreased after solving algebra problems.
More recently, Dewar et al. (2007) found the same effect with
a word-list when using images, arithmetic problems, a set of
clips, or others cognitive-loaded tasks. However, memory systems
are not isolated and they might interact. Thus, some authors
suggested that memory interference occurs when the acquired
memory and the new one activate similar brain structures
which overlap and compete for limited neuronal resources
(Keisler and Shadmehr, 2010; Cohen and Robertson, 2011;
Robertson, 2012). Therefore, different memory systems and/or
valences may interfere each other when the representations
activated and the neuronal structures involved, overlap and
compete. For example, Keisler and Shadmehr (2010) reported
interference between motor and declarative memory systems.
This could be understood considering that the hippocampus
not only plays a major role in declarative memories but
it was also found to be associated with the consolidation
of motor memories (Shadmehr and Holcomb, 1997; Squire,
2004; Keisler and Shadmehr, 2010). Albeit other processing
structures involved in cognitive and executive control, such
as the dorsolateral cortex or the hippocampus, may regulate
the interaction between memories and modulate the fate of
memories and their interference (Anderson, 2003; Costanzi et al.,
2009; Kuhl et al., 2010; Cohen and Robertson, 2011; Robertson,
2012).
Our results are in line with these ideas, suggesting that when
non-overlapping or partially overlapping memory systems are
engaged during memory reconsolidation, memory interference
does not occur (Experiments 3 and 4). However, when there is
high-overlapping memory systems (re-use of similar pathways)
which compete for neuronal resources, memory reconsolidation
could be interfered (Experiments 1 and 2). All in all, these
findings reveal that in the same way that reconsolidation does
not occur every time a memory is retrieved, interference is not
produced every single time a new memory is acquired.
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